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MAKING REPUTATION SYSTEM TRACEABLE WITHOUT LOSING PRIVACY 
 
Keli Zhang, Yi Xian Yang 
 
Preliminary note 
In existing reputation system nodes usually adopt regular pseudonyms instead of true identities to gain the anonymity. However complete anonymity will 
cause watershed and Sybil attack, which look on system be out of control and break the fairness of the reputation system. This paper introduces the 
conditional anonymity mechanism to check the evaluation between anonymity nodes, evaluation between two nodes if not more than the several times, 
but not be evaluated between two pseudonyms belong to the same peer. It will be effective, otherwise, the node true identity will be exposed, if number of 
attacks of the peer within the time exceeds d times, nodes in the evaluation and transaction will be tracked. Analysis shows that this mechanism cannot 
only protect the identity of peer's anonymity, but identify and track malicious attackers. 
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Izrada sljedivog sustava ugleda bez gubitka privatnost 
 
Prethodno propćenje 
U postojećim čvorovima sustava ugleda obično se prihvaćaju redoviti pseudonimi umjesto pravog identiteta radi postizanja anonimnosti. Međutim, 
potpuna anonimnost će uzrokovati prekretnicu i Sybil napad, koji bi sustav ugleda stavio izvan kontrole i razbio pravičnost sustava ugleda. Ovaj rad 
predstavlja uvjetni mehanizam anonimnosti za provjeru vrednovanja između anonimnosti čvorova, vrednovanja između dva čvora ako se ne ponavlja 
nekoliko puta, ne može se vrednovati između dva pseudonima koji pripadaju istoj razini. On će biti učinkovit, ako će pravi identitet čvora biti izložen, ako 
je broj napada iste razine unutar vremena koje prelazi d vremena, čvorovi u procjeni i transakciji će biti praćeni. Analiza pokazuje da ovaj mehanizam ne 
samo da može zaštititi identitet istorazinske anonimnosti, već će identificirati i pratiti zlonamjerne napadače. 
 
Ključne riječi: privatnost; pseudonim; sljediv; sustav ugleda; uvjetna anonimnost 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
The basic idea of trust and reputation model is to 
allow mutual evaluation between both sides of a deal [1]. 
The evaluation will help other nodes determine whether to 
make a deal with the node being evaluated. The reputation 
of a user depends entirely on its identity. In order to 
accumulate its reputation value, a user will normally use 
its real identity or use a pseudonym for a long time. But a 
long-term use of the same identity will link all the 
exchange information of a user together. Malicious users 
or outlaws will systematically analyse the data. All the 
activities and hobbies of a user will be exposed. This will 
pose a grave threat to the privacy of users [2]. 
In order to ensure complete anonymity, users need to 
change their pseudonyms periodically, which will incur 
the conflict between privacy and reputation, render 
reputation evaluation uncontrollable, and reduce the 
accountability of the reputation system. Truthful users 
may suffer from malicious users while malicious users 
can go unpunished. It is because malicious users abandon 
their previous pseudonyms along with the reputation 
values, and regain a new one with an initial value. 
Besides, due to lack of controllability, two users can 
collude with each other and make false mutual 
evaluations to increase their reputation value; malicious 
users will generate many pseudonyms to evaluate 
themselves, increasing their reputation value. 
To solve the above-mentioned problems, this paper 
introduces evaluative mechanism, conditional anonymity 
in reputation system. Each user will first acquire an 
evaluation container from TTP based on CL protocol, and 
generate a Rater certificate and a Ratee certificate. When 
the user submits its reputation value to TTP, Rater 
certificate and Ratee certificate will be submitted as well. 
Evaluation certificates will anonymously monitor 
reputation evaluations between nodes. Only if the 
following anonymity conditions are met: 1) no ramming 
attack or aspersion; 2) no Sybil attack; can a node gain the 
reputation value, otherwise, the real identity of a node 
will be exposed. If a node is attacked d times or more in a 
limited amount of time, all evaluation and exchange 
information of the node will be traced. In this protocol, 
reputation value is bound to the fixed identity (public key 
or other permanent identity) to strike a balance between 
anonymity and reputation and ensure the privacy of 
identity when the reputation value is updated based on 
blind signature scheme. 
 
2 Related work 
 
At present, among researches on reputation system, 
most focus on building distributed reputation systems 
rather than worrying about privacy [3, 4]. In [5÷7], the 
works only address the conflict issue of anonymity in 
reputation system. In [8, 9], users use vague identities, but 
all their activities will still be linked. Authors [2, 10] 
allow a user to have multiple pseudonyms, but transaction 
information of each pseudonym will be linked by 
attackers. In [11, 12], peers gain anonymity through 
concealing their pseudonyms. But these systems still 
cannot ensure completely anonymity of users. In [13, 17], 
users periodically change their pseudonyms to ensure the 
anonymity of their identity and cut the links between 
pseudonyms. But in [13], the author only ensures that the 
e-cash as the reputation value cannot be repeatedly used, 
but does not control the frequency of evaluation for the 
two pseudonyms. In [17], the author introduces two TTPs 
to control the frequency of evaluations between two users, 
but the real identity of the two users is exposed to a third-
party, secure multiparty computation [14] and 
Homomorphic encryption [16] is proposed to protect the 
identity of rater, but the protocol cannot to identity and 
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resist the Malicious attacks. Recently a new cryptographic 
primitive called signature of reputation was proposed in 
[15].  
Conditional anonymity remains an important 
research subject. At present, research is mainly focused 
on e-cash [18, 19]. Another kind of research is focused on 
key escrow [20, 21]. Recent correlation study [22, 23] is 
about a user being able to only use k anonymous and 
unlinked identities in a limited amount of time. 
Conditional anonymity in reputation system is rarely 




Preliminaries are classified into bilinear map, 
complexity assumptions and cryptographic tool. The 
main classification is as follows: 
 
3.1  Bilinear map 
 
Assume 1G , 2G , TG  are cyclic groups with the 
exponent being prime number q, and 1g  is the generator 
of 1G , 2g  the generator of 2G ; η  is the isomorphism 
that can realize the calculation from 2G  to 1G , 
2 1( )g gη = ; e is a bilinear map: 1 2: Te G G G× → . If the 
following condition is met, then the group 1 2( , )G G  is a 
bilinear group: 1) bilinearities: 1 1g G∈ , 2 2 ,g G∈
, qa b Z∈ , 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
a b abe g g e g g=  are given; 2) non-
degeneracy: 1 2( , ) 1e g g ≠ ; 3) computability: map e can 
effectively compute any input pairs. 
 
3.2  Complexity assumptions 
 
• Strong RSA assumption  
Strong RSA assumption [24]: Assuming n pq=  is 
the RSA modulus, ( 2 ' 1p p= + , 2 ' 1q q= +  and p, 'p , 
'q  are prime numbers) component ng Z
∗∈ , when 1e >  
and the condition modeh g n≡  is met, it is difficult to 
find a two-tuples ( , )h e . 
 
3.3  Cryptographic tool 
 
• CL signature 
Camenish-Lysyanskaya (CL signature) [25] scheme 
is based on strong RSA assumption. It is between a user 
and a signer, allowing the user to acquire a signatureσ  
about the question C (C is a specific question about
1( ,..., )lv v ). But the signer does not know the exact value 
of C. The signer calculates ( )CLSign C and sends it to the 
user, who will get 1( ,..., )lsign v vσ = , and be able to 
verify the signature through 1( , ( ,..., )) 1lVerif v vσ = . 
When the user verifies the signature, besides giving 
necessary information to the signer, he also has to send to 
the signer the signature of knowledge that holds 
information on the value of C 1( ,..., )lv v . 
• DY Verifiable Random Function 
Assume G g=< >  is a group with the exponent 
being q (a large prime number), qs Z∈ . This model 
adopts verifiable random function 1/( 1), ( )
DY x s
g sF x g
+ +=
qx Z
∗∈  put forward by Dodia and Yampolskiy [26]. This 
function is secure under Y-DDHI. 
- Pedersen commitment 
- Pedersen [27] puts forward a commitment scheme on 
discrete logarithm problem. The public parameter is 
the prime exponent q of the group. The generated 
components (g0,…, gm), and commitment components
1( ,..., )
m
m qv v Z∈ . Choose a random number qr Z∈ , 
- r1 m 0 1( ,..., v ; r) g
im v
ii
C PedCom v g
=
= =  . 
 
• Blind signature 
D. Chuam first put forward the term blind signature 
[28]. Blind signature means that someone needs to sign 
for some data, unaware of the contents of the data. 
Compared with normal digital signatures, blind digital 
signature has two prominent features: (1) the contents of 
the information are not known to the signer; (2) after the 
signature is publicized by the recipient, the signer cannot 
trace the signature.  
 
• Known discrete-logarithm-based, zero-knowledge 
proofs 
This paper uses the identification of zero-knowledge 
proof based on discrete logarithm put forward by 
Camenisch and Stadler [30]. For example:  
,}:){( ββδβ h~g~y~hgy,,PK ∂∂ =∧=∂ denotes the zero-
knowledge proof of , ,β δ∂ , and y g hβ∂= , βh~g~y~ ∂=  
are tenable, where y, g, h, y~ , g~ , h~  are components of 
G g h=< >=< >  and .>>=<=< h~g~G~  In the meantime, 
Fait-Shamir [29] heuristic can be used to turn zero-
knowledge proof into knowledge signature of m , written 
as: {( ) : }( )SPK y g mα ∂= . 
 
4  General descriptions 
 
This chapter will introduce assumptions of the 
system, participants and general designing ideas, etc. 
 
4.1  Assumptions 
 
Network environment: Assume the whole 
reputation system is situated in anonymous network (an 
Onion Router, Mixnet, etc.). 
Pseudonym: Many pseudonyms will be deposited at 
every node in advance. The validity of pseudonyms will 
be verified by TTP. 
 
4.2 Participating entities 
 
Node(User): A node is a normal node in the network. 
Each node plays two different roles: as a Rater, it gives 
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The evaluation values to other nodes, or as a Ratee, it 
receives others’ evaluation of itself. Transaction and 
evaluation between two nodes is realized through 
pseudonym, which is also used to show the reputation 
value to other users. 
TTP (Trusted Third Party): TTP controls 
information related to the reputation of each node. It 
creates a reputation account for each user based on the 
user’s public key. It is assumed that TTP is trusted when 
verifying pseudonyms and calculating the reputation 
value, but not trusted when it comes to user’s privacy. 
 
4.3  General designing ideas  
 
Assume the CL signature key pair of TTP and user’s 
key pair are ( , )TTP TTPpk sk and ( , )u upk sk respectively, 
where uskupk g= . ,
DY
g sF is the DY pseudo-random 
function. Each user will first anonymously acquire a 
certificate container from TTP. The container consists of 
the key seed s and a user’s key usk of ,
DY
g sF , and the CL 
signature of TTP ( , )usk s . CL signature ensures that TTP 
will not know s and usk . After a deal is over, Rater first 
generates evaluation certificate raterCert and submits it to 
Ratee. raterCert consists of: tag of the certificate
, 1( )
DY
g sS F R= , double evaluation equation
, 2( )
DY r
u g sT pk F R= and ZKPOK φ (which proves that S 
and T are validly generated by ( , )TTP usk sσ ). 1R  and 2R  
are related to Ratee’s pseudonym. Subsequently, Ratee 
generates Ratee certificate rateeCert , Ratee certificate is 
similar to evaluative certificate, consisting of the tag of 
certificate 11, ( )
DY
g sV F R= , double evaluation equation
21,
( )DY tu g sW pk F R= and ZKPOK ϕ . 1R  and 2R are the 
same with 1R  and 2R  in the evaluation certificate. Ratee 
submits raterCert  and rateeCert  to TTP. TTP verifies 
raterCert  and rateeCert . If they are valid, TTP 
temporarily deposits raterCert  and rateeCert . If they are 
invalid, TTP abandons raterCert and rateeCert . 
If Rater evaluates the same user twice or more in a 
limited amount of time, two evaluation certificates
raterCert must use the same evaluation tag S, and the two 
Ratee certificates rateeCert must use the same tag V as 
well. Thus, TTP can acquire the public key of Rater and 
























−−= ; if both 
pseudonyms of the same user make evaluations,  
evaluative certificate tag V and Ratee certificate tag S will 








−−= based on double evaluation 
equation T and W. TTP records the identity of the 
malicious violator that gets caught. When the node 
updates its reputation value to TTP with the same public 
key, it must submit a sub-key si of the evaluation 
container. si is generated through verifiable key sharing 
mechanism. Each si contains a verifiable secret piece. 
Once the number of si acquired from a certain node by 
TTP exceeds the threshold, the s of the node’s evaluation 
container will be leaked, and all the node’s evaluations 
will be traced. 
 
5   Security model 
5.1  The definition of general security 
 
The protocol is mainly composed of the following 
protocols and algorithms:   
• TTPKeygen(1 ,params)k : The key-generation 
algorithm of TTP. Input the system’s public 
parameter1k and the identity of TTP, the output will 
be the public/private key pair of TTP ( , )TTP TTPpk sk . 
• UserKeyGen(1 ,params)k : The key-generation 
algorithm of the node. Input the system’s parameter
1k and the identity of the node ID, the output will be 
the public/private key pair of the node ( , )u upk sk . 
• Withdraw( ( , ), ( , ))u u TTP TTPU pk sk TTP pk sk Evaluation 
certificate withdrawal protocol. The node acquires 
evaluation certificate container from TTP. The node’s 
output will be evaluation container W, or false 
information. 
• ( ( , ), ( , , ))M M TTP MRaterCert U W pk M sk pk P
Evaluation certificate-generation protocol. Node U 
(using pseudonym UP ), based on the evaluation 
certificate container, generates evaluative certificate
raterCert on node M (using pseudonym MP ). M 
acquires the evaluation tag S of raterCert and the 
validity proof of the identification π. 
• ( ( , ), ( , , ))TTP TTP TTP MRateeCert M W pk TTP sk pk P
Evaluated certificate-generation protocol. Node M 
(using pseudonym MP ) submits Ratee certificate
rateeCert to TTP. TTP acquires the evaluated 
identification V of M and the validity proof of the 
identificationϕ . 
• VerifyRep(M(( , ), ( , ), ), ( , ))TTP TTP TTPS V pk TTP pk skp ϕ
Reputation evaluation verifying protocol. If Rater and 
Ratee are both trusted, TTP will accept the Ratee 
certificate and Rater certificate submitted by Ratee M 
(using pseudonym MP ). 
• RepDeposit(M( , ), ( , ))TTP TTP TTPpk TTP pk skσ
Reputation value depositing protocol. If the blind 
signature is valid, TTP will deposit and update the 
new reputation value of node M. 
• 1 2Identity(params, , , )S p p Attacker identification 
algorithm. The system can identify the same 
certificate tag S of the attacker, and the two 
identification proofs π1 and π2. The output of the 
algorithm is a public key upk and the proof GΠ . 
• VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ Guilt verifying 
algorithm. It allows publicizing the guilt proof GΠ . 
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5.1.1 Soundness 
 
Rater can evaluate its deal-maker through the 
evaluation certificate container. But the frequency of 
evaluation cannot exceed a limit. A knowledge extractor
Κ  is given. Κ and the adversary execute the certificate 
withdrawal protocol Withdraw , extracting m evaluation 
certificate tags 1 2, ..... mS S S . For each evaluation certificate 
identification of the adversary, when iS S≠ 1 i m∀ ≤ ≤ , 
the probability that TTP accepts ( , )S p as a valid 
evaluation certificate is negligible. 
 
5.1.2 Identification of the attacker 
 
Assume TTP is truthful, and 1U  and 2U are both 
truthful users. When 1U , 2U  and the adversary execute 
the evaluation certificate-generation protocol, the output 
of 1U  will be 1( , )S p , the output of 2U 2( , )S p . This 
guarantees high probability that the public key upk and 
proof GΠ generated from 1 2Identity(params, , , )S p p are 
accepted by VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ . 
 
5.1.3 Anonymity  
 
TTP cannot acquire any information on Ratee or 
Rater even if it colludes with malicious users. This 
protocol introduces simulator S. S has some information 
that other participants cannot know. For example: in a 
normal parameter model, S itself generates information on 
parameters. In a random oracle model, S is the controlled 
random oracle. Simulator S should be able to simulate 
evaluation certificates (Rater certificate and Ratee 
certificate) without accessing the certificate container. 
The simulated certificate cannot be distinguished from the 
valid certificate. To be more specific, S can execute 
certificate-generation protocol (Rater certificate and Ratee 
certificate) without knowing secret s of the certificate 




Assume the adversary participated in the execution of 
the certificate-withdrawal protocol of a truthful node with 
the public key being upk , and subsequently in the 
execution of certificate-generation protocol of the user. 
When an attacker inputs a public key certificate upk and a 
forged proof GΠ , and claims the user is the attacker, the 
probability that forged proof GΠ  gets accepted by
VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ is negligible. 
 
5.2  Definition of formal security 
 
The definition of formal security depends on 
knowledge extractor K and the simulator S. For a given 
deal, the knowledge extractor K and extract the evaluated 
certificate tag of the adversary (when unaware of the 
node’s key or the secret of the certificate container, 
simulator S) can simulate the evaluation certificate-
generation protocol and the evaluated certificate-
generation protocol. Under normal circumstances, the 
definition of knowledge extractor K and the simulator S 
depends on provable security model. To make the 
definition more general, a special protocol like a 
knowledge proof or zero-knowledge proof is needed. For 
example: a knowledge proof in the withdrawal protocol 
Withdraw, while a zero-knowledge proof in the evaluation 
certificate (Ratee certificate) generation protocol. 
X Y− is used to represent the security model, 
( , , )X IO BB NBB∈ , (where IO represents the input-
output model, BB represents black-box model, and NBB 
represents non-black-box model), ( , )Y K RO∈ . The 
algorithm (Alg) with which Adversary A accesses X Y−
model is ( )lgX Y AA − . In some models of public-parameter, 
knowledge extractor K and simulator S are allowed to 
access some auxiliary information (the auxiliary 
information will not be provided to participants. The 
information knowledge extractor K and simulator S 
access respectively are represented by auxext and auxsim. 
In the X Y−  model in the language L, 
( )
Pr ,





Κ  represents the knowledge 
extractor of knowledge proof protocol (Prot), while
( )
Pr ,
( , , )
X Y A
ot L
S params auxsim x
−
represents zero-knowledge 
simulator of proof protocol (Prot). 
 
5.2.1 Validity  
 
To make it easier to analyse, Withdraw  protocol is 
divided into three parts: bWithdraw , mWithdraw and 
eWithdraw , respectively denoting the beginning, the 
middle and the ending of the protocol (letters b, m, e 
represents beginning, middle and ending). bWithdraw
ends when the node sends message to TTP. eWithdraw
ends when TTP sends message to the user. eWithdraw is 
taken as the proof protocol. The user is the prover, TTP 
verifier. mWithdraw output from the verifier determines 
whether TTP will continue eWithdraw , and send the 
ending message to the peer. 1m represents the first 
information the peer will send to TTP. 1b represents the 
state information when TTP received 1m . The detailed 
requirements of validity are as follows:  
a) Whatever model is given, there exists a highly 
efficient interpretable language SL  and a knowledge 
extractor
( )
Pr , 1 1
( , , , )
X Y A
ot L
params auxext b m
−
Κ . All 1b are 
calculated by TTP. All 1m  are extracted tags
1 2( , ..... , )mS S S auxα = , 1 1( , , ) Sb m Lα ∈ . In mWithdraw
the probability that TTP accepts 1m is not negligible. 
b) With regard to input ( , )TTPparams pk , adversary 
A executes the game as follows: A plays withdrawal 
protocol with TTP and reputation verifying protocol 
VerifyRep for any times. If the ist withdrawal protocol
Withdraw succeeds, then the output of knowledge 
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extractor
( )
Pr , 1, 1,
( , , , , )
X Y A
ot L i i i
params auxext pk b m
−
Κ will be
1, 1,( , , )i i i Sb m Lα ∈ ; the evaluation identifications list 
acquired by f executing Withdraw is represented by
,( | ,1 )f i jA S i f j m= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ . For some f, in reputation 
verifying protocol, if the honest TTP accepts evaluation 
identification fS A∉ , A wins. It needs to be proven that 
the probability is negligible that adversary A wins the 
game within probabilistic polynomial time (PPT). 
 
5.2.2 The identification of attacker 
 
The feature of identifying the attacker ensures that 
within PPT time, the probability that the adversary A wins 
the following game is negligible. Public parameter model 
assumes params and auxext are fixed. 
With regard to input ( , )TTPparams pk , adversary A 
executes the game as follows: A executes Withdraw and 
reputation verifying protocol VerifyRep  with TTP. If the 
withdrawal protocol is executed successfully, the output 







1, 1,( , , )i i i Sb m Lα ∈ ; iA refers to the evaluation tag of the 
node with the public key being ipk . In the reputation 
verifying protocol VerifyRep , if TTP accepts twice the 
same evaluation identification iS A∈ , the attacker 
identifying algorithm 1 2Identity(Params, , , )S p p
generates ipk and the proof GΠ . The probability is 
relatively high that VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ
accepts the public key ipk and the proof GΠ . 
 
5.2.3 Anonymity  
 
Assume adversary A inquires whatever information 
with the public key TTPpk :  
a) Public key of the inquiry node j: A requests and 
accepts the public key jpk of j, and generates valid and 
truthful key pair ( , )j jpk sk . 
b) Withdraw of node j: A and j execute
Withdraw( ( , ), ( ))u uU pk sk A state , state refers to the state 
of A. The ist Withdraw inquiry is represented by iW . If 
iW is false information, iW is the invalid certificate 
container. 
c) RaterCert of j: A executes RaterCert generation 
protocol based on the container W: 
( ( ), ( ))jRaterCert U W A state . 
If A only makes reputation evaluation based on valid 
certificate container, but never makes evaluations of 
violations, then A is valid. 
 An existing simulator ( )(.) ( , ,.)X Y AS params auxsim− is 
needed. No valid adversary A can distinguish whether it is 
playing Game R(Real) or Game I(Ideal):  
Game R: The answer to the question A inquires is 
shown above. 
Game I: The public key A inquires and Withdraw 
answer are shown above. With regard to reputation 
evaluation certificate generation protocol RaterCert , A 
interacts with simulator ( )(.) ( , , )X Y A TTPS params auxsim pk
−




Excludability ensures that only nodes that make 
malicious attacks need to be punished, while honest nodes 
need not. There are two kinds of excludability: weak 
excludability and strong excludability. Weak 
excludability punishes nodes that make attacks, while 
strong excludability not only punishes nodes that make 
attacks, but also makes malicious attackers accountable 
for their behaviour. This paper considers only weak 
excludability. To define the weak excludability in this 
chapter, assume adversary A will make the following 
attacks on user U:  
a) Initialization Adversary A acquires the public 
key of TTP through attacks. 
b) Inquiry Adversary A inquires node U as such:  
Withdraw: The adversary fakes its identity as TTP 
and executes certificate withdrawal protocol Withdraw 
with the user. The user outputs the evaluation certificate 
container W. 
RaterCert: The adversary fakes its identity as Ratee, 
and executes evaluation certificate generation protocol 
with Rater. Rater’s output is the evaluation certificate 
container W . 
Success criterion: When the protocol ends, if
VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ accepts adversary A’s 
output ( , )GS Π , then A wins the game. 
 
6   Detailed description of the protocols 
 
This chapter introduces the initialization, evaluation 
certificate withdrawal protocol (Withdraw), evaluation 
Rater certificate-generation protocol (RaterCert), Ratee 
certificate-generation protocol (RateeCert), reputation 
evaluation verifying protocol (VerifyRep), reputation 
value updating protocol (RepDepost), attacker identifying 
algorithm (Identity) and tracing malicious nodes. 
 
6.1  Initialization 
 
• Instructions on the parameter 
1 1G g=< > , n is the modulus of special RSA. 1g is 
the quadratic residue modulus n, 1 1h G∈ . Pedersen 
commitment and CL signature based on RSA both use 
this parameter.  
2 2G g=< > , 2g  is the prime exponent (2 )
kq = Θ , 
2 2h G∈ . Certificate identification, double evaluation 
equation both use this parameter and 1/( 1), 2( )
DY x s
g sF x g
+ += . 
• Key generation 
TTP key generation: by executing TTP key 
generation algorithm TTPKeygen(1 ,params)k  g CL 
signature key pair and blind signature key pair of TTP
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( , )TTP TTPpk sk and ( , )TTP TTPpk sk
σ σ respectively will be 
generated;  
User’s key generation: by executing user’s key 
generation algorithm UserKeyGen(1 ,params)k , and 
inputting the system parameter1k node’s identity ID, user 
public/private key pair ( , )u upk sk will be generated. 
 
6.2  Evaluation certificate container withdrawal protocol  
 
Assume the user and TTP authenticate each other. 
The protocol with which the user acquires evaluation 
certificate container from TTP is as follows. The protocol 
is executed based on CHL e-cash withdrawal protocol:  
1) The user uses the real identity to negotiate a 
commitment value 'C with TTP with regard to 
qs Z∈ : the user chooses a random number
*' ns Z∈ , 
and calculates Pedersen commitment
'
0 1 2' ( , '; ) (modn)
sk sur
uC PedCom sk s r g g g= = . The user 
sends 'C and upk to TTP, as well as the 
corresponding secret s to 'C  and the zero-knowledge 
proof of the user’s private key usk  .   
2) TTP first verifies the zero-knowledge signatureφ . If 
it is correct, TTP chooses a random number *' nr Z∈ , 
calculates '0' (modn)
rC C g= , and executes CL 
signature 1/ ' ' 1/e0 1 2 0mod ( )u
ske s r r
TTP C n g g g gσ = = . TTP 
sends TTPσ and 'r to the user, and deposits the 
acquired C, upk , φ , 'r  , TTPσ  into the database, 
used to identify malicious users. 
3) The user calculates ( ' ') mods s r n= + , and verifies 
the CL signature of TTP, or verifies whether the 
following equation is tenable:  
 
0 1 2( )uTTP
ske s rg g gσ =                                                  (1) 
 
If it is, the user can confirm it is the signature of TTP. 
4) The user certificate container is 
( , , ( , ))u TTP uW sk s sk sσ= , where s is the secret of the 
evaluation certificate container, ( , )TTP usk sσ  is the 
signature of TTP. According to CL signature 
protocol, TTP cannot know the values of ,usk s . 
 
6.3  Evaluation certificates generation protocol 
 
Two users U and M use UP and MP to make a deal. 
After the deal, UP evaluates MP . UP will generate 
evaluation certificate raterCert based on the information on 
PM’s pseudonym and its own certificate container. The 
process of UP generating raterCert is as follows:  
1) PM calculates R1 = H(0ΠPM), R2 = H(1ΠPM); H(.) is a 
one-way hash function with strong collision 
resistance;  
2) PM sends the random number r to PU, where qr Z∈ ;  
3) PU sends the certificate identification and double 
evaluation Eq. , 1( )
DY
g sS F R= ; , 2( )
DY r
u g sT pk F R=  
4) PU sends ZKPOK φ of 1 2( , , , , ( , ))u TTP uR R sk s sk sσ to 
PM:  
• R1 = H(0ΠPM);  
• R2 = H(1ΠPM);  
• , 1( )
DY
g sS F R= ;  
• , 2( )
DY r
u g sT pk F R= ;  
• ( , ( , ), ( , ))TTP TTP uVerifySig pk sku s sk s trueσ = ZKPOK 
in 4) is acquired in the following way: 
a) PU calculates ( )uB PedCom sk= , ( )C PedCom s= ; 
and proves the commitment values of B and C are CL 
signatures of TTP;  
b) It should be proven that 2 1, 1
1/ 1( )DYg s
s RS F R g + += =
and 2, 2 2
/( 1)( )rDYu g s
usk r R sT pk F R g + + += = , and 
the result of knowledge signature isφ . 
5) PM verifies the validity of ( , ( , , ))raterCert S r Tp φ= = . 
If it is valid, PM temporarily saves the rater certificate
raterCert . 
 
6.4  Evaluated certificate generation protocol 
 
PM generates evaluated certificate rateeCert based on 
the information on its own pseudonym and its certificate 
container W. rateeCert is generated in the same way as











, ( ) u
DY t
u
sk t s R
g sW pk F R g
+ + += = , R1 = H(0ΠPM), R2 
= H(1ΠPM). 1s is the secret of evaluation certificate 
container of. t is randomly generated by PM. ω is the non-
interactive zero-knowledge signature. 
 
6.5  Reputation evaluation verifying protocol 
 
1) PM submits Rater certificate raterCert and Ratee 
certificate rateeCert to TTP. TTP first verifiesφ . Ifφ is 
not valid, TTP abandons ( , ( , , ))raterCert S r Tp φ= = ; 
if φ is valid, TTP temporarily saves raterCert
submitted by MP . 
2) TTP subsequently verifies ω. If ω is not valid, TTP 
abandons raterCert and rateeCert . If it is valid, TTP 
needs to further verify in the following way:  1) 
whether S equals V; 2) whether S is the same with all 
the S in raterCert being deposited. If the above two 
conditions are met, TTP accepts raterCert and rateeCert , 
sends feedback message of reputation evaluation 
verified to PM, and deposits raterCert and rateeCert . 
 
6.6  Reputation value updating protocol 
 
After raterCert and rateeCert are verified, reputation 
value of PM should be updated. But since the reputation 
account of PM is bound to the real identity MU of PM. If 
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PM updates reputation value directly, TTP will know PM is 
the temporary certificate of UM, and reveal the link 
between user’s temporary certificate and real identity. 
Assume that U colludes with TTP. U will know PM is the 
pseudonym of M, which poses grave threat to M’s 
privacy. In order to solve this problem, blind signature is 
introduced when updating reputation value [28]. Two 
steps are adopted:  
1) PM chooses random information D, and sends it 
to TTP. TTP gives blind signature on D. PM acquires 
blind permissionσ . PM deposits blind permissionσ in its 
own database. 
M sends the blind permission ( , )D σ to TTP with its 
real identity UM. TTP verifies whether the blind 
permission was used. If not, TTP updates the reputation 
value of M in reputation account. 
 
6.7  Attacker identifying 
6.7.1 Identifying the attacker 
 
If the certificate identification S in raterCert equals 
certificate identification V in rateeCert , it means two 
temporary certificates of the same user are making mutual 
evaluations. Since in 2 1, 1
1/ 1( )DYg s






g sV F R g
+ += = , 1R is the same, and the 
secret of each node s is unique, then s must be the same 
with 1s . TTP can calculate the user’s public key through 
two double evaluation equations
2, 2
2/( 1)( )rDYu g s




, ( ) u
DY t
u
sk t s R
g sW pk F R g
+ + += = , and generate 
violation proof 1 2( , )G p pΠ = . The calculation of the 








−−=                                                               (3) 
 
If S is the same with any S in raterCert saved by TTP, 
it shows the frequency of mutual evaluations made 
between two users exceeds a limit. For Rater, 1 1 1( ,r T p∈） , 
2 2 2( ,r T p∈） have the same identification S. Through two 
double evaluation equations 
11
1 2, 2
2/( 1)( )rDYu g s
usk r R sT pk F R g + + += = and
22
2 2, 2
2/( 1)( )rDYu g s
usk r R sT pk F R g + + += = , TTP 
calculates the identity of Rater and generates the violation 
proof 1 2( , )G p pΠ = . The calculation of the public key of 












−−=                                                         (4) 
 
For Ratee, 1 1 1( ,t W ψ∈） , 2 2 2( ,t W ψ∈） have the same 
identification V. Through two double evaluation 
equations, 11 1 21 2 21
/( 1)
, ( ) u
tDY
u
sk t s R
g sW pk F R g




, ( ) u
tDY
u
sk t s R
g sW pk F R g
+ + += = , TTP calculates 
the identity of Ratee and generates the violation proof
1 2( , )G ϕ ϕΠ = , The calculation of the public key of Ratee 













−−=                                                        (5) 
 
6.7.2 Verifying violation proof 
 
Violation proof 1 2( , )G p pΠ = , where ( , , )i i i ir Tp φ= . 
Operate 1 2Identity(params, , , )S p p algorithm, compare 
the output with the output of public key upk . Use it as 
input and check if these two match. Subsequently, verify
iφ related to ( , , )i i iS r T . If both are verified as valid, then
VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ accepts the violation 
proof, otherwise it refuses the violation proof. TTP 
records the violator in the set Ψ . 
 
6.8 Tracing malicious nodes 
 
Complete anonymity does not mean that none of 
evaluations of deals can be traced. If that is the case, such 
a system will bring convenience to outlaws. This paper 
has the following considerations when tracing malicious 
nodes: a) if it is a valid evaluation, TTP cannot identify 
the user’s real identity, or trace the user; b) if the violation 
of a node occurs less than d times in a limited amount of 
time, the node will not be traced; c) if the violation of a 
node occurs more than d times in a limited amount of 
time, the system will trace the violator. In order to trace a 
violator, TTP needs to acquire the key s of the violator’s 
certificate container. The process is as follows: 
 
6.8.1 The generation of a sub-key 
 
By using Feldman’s non-interactive verifiable key 
sharing, assume d is the pre-set threshold value. If the 
public key upk of the violator first appears in the setΨ of 
TTP, the node needs to select a 1d − key sharing 
polynomial ( )f x . The calculation of polynomial 
coefficient is: 1/ ( 1 )ik s R i= + + + , where ( )uR H pk= , s 
is the secret of evaluation container, 0,...,ii d= ; the 
polynomial generated is 0 1( ) ... mod
d
df x k k x K x q= + + , 
modikiC g p= . Take 0{ ,..., }dC C as the coefficient’s 
commitment value of the polynomial ( )f x . The sub-key
0...( ,{ } , , ( ), )i u i i ds pk C x f x d== , ( || )i ix V H r T= = . d is the 
threshold value. 
 
6.8.2 Verifying the sub-key 
 
When the node updates its reputation value, if upk is 
in the violators set Ψ in the time limit ( )t n , the peer must 
submit valid is . The number of is submitted depends on 
the times of the number of upk in Ψ this time. Otherwise, 
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TTP refuses to update the reputation value. The process of 
verifying the sub-key:  
a) TTP verifies the received sub-key
0...( ,{ } , , ( ), )u i i dpk C x f x d= . Through calculating
( )
0 1 ... mod
f x x d
dg C C C x p= ∗ ∗ , TTP verifies whether
( , ( ))x f x is the node of the polynomial ( )f x based on
{ }iC commitment. If not, TTP refuses the request of 
updating the node’s reputation value. 
b) If a sub-key with the public key being upk already 
exists, TTP needs to verify whether x was used, and 
whether 0{ ,..., }dC C are the same。 
When the certificate is verified as valid, TTP updates
Ψ , and deletes upk fromΨ . 
 
6.8.3 The leaking of automatic threshold 
 
In the time period t, for the same evaluation public 
key upk , if TTP acquires d sub-keys is , TTP can acquire 
the key s of the certificate container by using the d sub-
keys is , and reconstructing polynomial ( )f x . The 
detailed process:  
a) TTP reconstructs the polynomial ( )f x by using 
the d sub-keys is ;  
Extract the constant term 0(0) 1 / 1f k s R= = + + of 
the polynomial ( )f x , where ( )uR H pk= . The key of the 
container s can be acquired. 
 
6.8.4 Tracing malicious nodes 
 
TTP uses 2 1, 1
1/ 1( )DYg s
s RS F R g + += = to calculate the 
evaluation certificate with the node’s public key being
ipk , and can trace all evaluation and transaction records 
of the node with the public key being ipk . 
 
7    Protocol analysis 
7.1   Validity analysis 
 
Theorem 1: A node cannot generate an invalid 
evaluation certificate through a certificate container. 







−= (knowing the private key of 
TTP) execute f Withdraw . Assume that the first step 
proof of knowledge (commitment 'C ) of Withdraw






−= is the extractor 
of knowledge proof. For the certificate withdrawal 
protocol Withdraw , except when K executes the code 
of K` in the first step to extract the value from ( , )usk s , K 
is considered a truthful TTP. After acquiring secret s, and 
K can the calculation 1 2( , ..... , , )m uS S S sk sα = be 
accomplished, where , ( )i DYg s iS F R= ( iR is the 
temporary information on Ratee’s temporary certificate), 
' ( , '; )uC PedCom SK s r= . When the execution of 
Withdraw protocol ends, K outputs ( , ', )K Sstate C Lα ∈ , 
where 'C  is the commitment, and equals
( , )uPedCom sK s the sent from adversary A in the
Withdraw protocol. Language SL is the triple (., ', )C α , 
where the first element can be of any value, but the 
second must be consistent with α . 
,i( | ,1 )f jA S j f i n= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  is the identification after f 
executes Withdraw. 
 If the knowledge proof in Withdraw protocol is non-
interactive, except the black box A accesses, K and K’ are 
both controlled by random oracle. 
fA includes all certificate tags of all deal-makers. For 
A to win the game, it must make sure that TTP will accept 
an evaluation certificate of a non-truthful proof with a 
relatively high probability.  
Assume A is sure that a truthful TTP receives invalid 
identification S in reputation evaluation verifying 
protocol, where fS A∉ . Then A must forge a wrong 
proof: a) A must know TTP’s signature on public B, C; b) 
S and T will be generated in the proof Γ. Under the 
assumption that CL signature is secure (based on strong 
RAS assumption and LRSW), a) occurs with the 
probability that 1( )V k is negligible; under the discrete 
assumption, b) occurs with the probability that 2 ( )V k is 
negligible. Then A occurs with the probability of
1 2( ) ( )V k V k+ . Thus, the total success probability of A is 
negligible. 
 
7.2  Anonymity analysis 
 
Theorem 2: The identity anonymity of Ratee and 
Rater should be ensured in executing the protocols. 
Proof: Adversary A can act as a corrupted TTP and 
Ratee, generate and publicize the public key TTPpk . 
Adversary A can executeWithdraw protocol for any times 
with any node. Eventually, adversary A will execute 
evaluation certificate generation protocol RaterCert
with some real Raters (having certificate container jW ) or 
simulator S (without jW ). 
Simulator ( ) ( , , ( ))IO RO A idS S Params auxsim H P
−= gives 
the input: public parameter params, supplementary 
information auxsim and ( )idH P ( idP  is the temporary 
certificate of Ratee). Given the random oracle model of 
the simulator and the input/output controlling model that 
adversary A accesses, simulator S executes evaluation 
certificate generation protocol RaterCert that adversary A 
requests in the following way:  
a) Simulator S receives a character string
{ }*info 0,1∈ ;  
b) Simulator S collects information on exchange, 
like info, TTPpk , time, etc.,  the fixed output of S as a 
random oracle is a random value *qr Z∈ ;  
c) S randomly chooses the secret s and calculates
, 1( )
DY
g sS F R= and , 2( )
rDY
u g sT pk F R= ;  
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d) S sends a reputation evaluation certificate
( , ( , , ))raterCert S r Tp φ= = to A. φ is the simulated 
signature proof generated through the following steps:  
• ( )uB PedCom sk= , ( )C PedCom s= and a 
simulated proof that proves the commitment values of B 
and C, which is based on CL signature of TTP; (in this 
step, S switches to CL simulator in random oracle model). 
• A real proof 11/ 1s RS g + += and the proof of
2/( 1)usk r R sT g + + += Γ . 
All the difficult problems of simulator S are 
knowledge proof problems about processing CL signature 
through the simulator. When withdrawing the protocol, 
due to CL signature, A does not know the key s of the 
certificate container and the user’s private key usk . 
Hence, the s simulator S chooses and the s the real user 
chooses are not mutually distinguishable. The 
components of evaluation certificate are
( , ( , , ))raterCert S r Tp φ= = , where r is selected by 
adversary or RO model (which are not mutually 
distinguishable). Based on the security of DY PRF, the 
identification S in the evaluation certificate and the 
double evaluation equation T are not distinguishable from 
the random elements in
2G . Since , 2( )
rDY
g sF R is 
calculated in cyclic groups of prime numbers, T looks 
random. Simulated φ consists of two real proofs and a 
simulated proof. The simulation proof is the only 
difference between the simulator S’s proofφ and the real 
user’s proof φ . Camenish Lysyanskaya simulator is 
operated to generate simulated proof. Due to the security 
of Camenish Lysyanskaya signature based on strong RSA 
or LRSW, the probability that A distinguishes Game R 
(from real user) and Game I (from simulator S) is 
negligible. 
 
7.3  Identifying the attacker 
 
Theorem 3: the malicious attacker will be identified.  
Proof: Since r is randomly chosen by truthful Ratee 
M, the probability that 1r equals 2r is very low. With 





u g sT pk F R= that has the same upk and s, the 
direct use of the correct 1 2( , , , )Identity Sγ p p algorithm can 
successfully restore the violator’s identity usku gpk = . 
Ratee M (or random oracle) chooses 1r and 2r . This 
determines the only 11 / ( 1)1 , 2( ) u
sk r srDY
u g s gT pk F R + +==
22 / ( 1)
2 , 2( ) u
sk r srDY
u g s gT pk F R + +== , which appears as the 
only valid and secure double evaluation equation with the 
evaluation identification S in the two reputation 
evaluation certificates. In order to generate different 
identifications in executing the evaluation certificate 
generation protocol RaterCert , A must change the valid 
proof p in the 4th step of the certificate generation 
protocol (in "validity proof", it has already been proven 
that the probability is negligible). 
Identity algorithm can output the public key upk of 
the attacker, and the malicious Rater’s proof 
1 2( , )G p pΠ = , because VerifyGuilt accepts only truthful 
Identity output, and truthful public key upk and GΠ will 
be accepted by VerifyGuilt(params, , , )G uS pkΠ with a 
relatively high probability. 
 
7.4  Non-frameability analysis 
 
Theorem 4: The forged evaluation certificate proof 
of other nodes can be identified. 
Proof: Any valid proof ip should concern the 
knowledge proof of the user’s private key (refer to 
evaluation certificate generation protocol). If the two 
reputation evaluation certificates 1( , )S p and 2( , )S p of the 
violation proof 1 2( , )G p p∏ = are accepted by a truthful 
TTP, it means there are two possibilities: 1) adversary A 
must successfully forge the knowledge proof. In “validity 
proof”, it has already been proven that the probability is 
negligible;  2) if 1( , )S p and 2( , )S p are accepted as 
different reputation evaluation certificates for they are 
registered as different users, VerifyGuilt  algorithm will 
refuse 1 2( , )G p pΠ = , because Identity algorithm cannot 
restore the user’s public key upk through the double 
evaluation equation generated by different public keys
upk and secret s. 
 
8 Comparison and contrast 
 
This paper adopts similar schemes to [31] and [32]. 
This chapter mainly compares this scheme with that of 
[31] and [32] in efficiency, anonymity and security. 
 
8.1  Efficiency comparison 
 
Table 1 Efficiency comparison 
Scheme Calculation (modular exponent) 
Complexity 
(Messages) 
The scheme Rater 11 O(1) TTP 16 
[31] scheme Rater 27 O(1) TTP 16 
[32] scheme 
Rater more than 30 
O(1) reputation 
value recipient more than 30 
 
The calculation of this scheme, and those from [31] 
and [32] is mainly on multi-based modular exponent and 
single-based modular exponent. But through proper 
methods, calculations like 1 21 2
x xg g can be taken as 1,2 
single modular exponent, and calculations like
31 2
1 2 3
xx xg g g can be taken as 1,5 modular exponent. 
Considering that the evaluation certificate container 
withdrawal protocol in this scheme, e-cash withdrawal 
protocol in [31] and user registration protocol in [32]can 
all be executed offline, the comparison on efficiency will 
mainly focus on the executing efficiency of these three 
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schemes in terms of reputation evaluation and reputation 
verifying protocol. 
In this scheme, Rater needs to execute modular 
exponent calculations for 11 times to generate reputation 
evaluation certificate.  TTP needs to execute modular 
exponent calculations for 16 times to verify the validity of 
the evaluation certificate and the Ratee certificate; in [31], 
Rater needs to execute modular exponent calculations for 
27 times to generate e-cash that acts as evaluation value. 
In the reputation evaluation verifying protocol, TTP needs 
to execute modular exponent calculations for 16 times to 
verify the validity of e-cash; in [32], reputation Rater 
needs to execute modular exponent calculations for more 
than 30 times to generate the signature of reputation 
value, and the reputation value recipient also needs to 
execute modular exponent calculations for more than 30 
times to verify the signature of the reputation value. 
Compared with [31] and [32], in terms of the 
complication of calculation, this scheme has made 
improvements. 
In terms of the complication of information, the three 
schemes are basically the same. 
 
8.2  Comparison of anonymity and security 
 
Both this scheme and [32] adopt zero-knowledge 
proof and blind signature technology to realize the 
anonymity of the Ratee. Though [31] adopts e-cash 
technology, this technology is based on zero-knowledge 
proof. Thus, the privacy technology used in these three 
schemes is similar; all three realized the anonymity of 
Ratee. But in terms of security, this scheme can resist and 
identify Sybil attack and ballot-stuffing attack. The work 
in [31] cannot resist or identify any malicious attack. And 
[32] can only resist Sybil attack. 
 
Table 2 Anonymity and security 
Scheme Key Security Mechanisms Ratee’s anonymity Security 
This scheme Zero-knowledge proof, blind signature supportive Resisting and identifying Sybil and ballot-stuffing attack 
[31] scheme e-cash supportive Not being able to identify the attacker 
[32] scheme Zero-knowledge proof, blind signature supportive Resisting Sybil attack 
 
9     Conclusion 
 
This paper addresses such problems as the conflict 
between anonymity and reputation and the 
uncontrollability of reputation evaluation that are 
prominent in reputation system where nodes’ identity is 
absolutely anonymous. It introduces conditional 
anonymity into reputation system to anonymously 
monitor the reputations evaluations made by users. Only 
when the anonymity condition is met can the reputation 
value be gained. Violators will be exposed and punished. 
Nodes that exceed the violation frequency in a certain 
time limit will be traced. Reputation evaluations made 
between users will be controlled. Based on blind 
signature, when a user updates the reputation value, its 
privacy can be protected, and its temporary certificates 
unlinked.  It can also reconcile the conflict between 
anonymity and reputation. 
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